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RECLAIMING REFUGEE RIGHTS AS
HUMAN RIGHTS
Roni Amit*
As the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”)1
turns 70, many of the rights laid out in this once aspirational
document have become well-established in treaty and customary
international law. One area where aspiration has not become reality,
however, is in the realm of asylum. Despite the UDHR’s
proclamation that everyone has the right both to seek and to enjoy
asylum (Article 14), refugee rights have not become human rights.
In fact, a mere three years after the UDHR, the Refugee Convention2
emerged with no corresponding right to asylum. The result has been
a lack of clarity over how refugee rights fit within the human rights
framework. As humanitarian crises around the world give rise to
unprecedented levels of migration, this gap provides a space for
states to evade their protection obligations and to place refugees
outside of the rights framework.
Refugee rights have always been somewhat at odds with the
fundamental principles underlying the international human rights
system. Although conceptually based on the idea that individuals
hold certain inalienable rights, the modern human rights system is
premised on the idea of individuals making rights claims against the
state. Yet, the refugee’s defining feature is the absence of a state
against which to make claims, what Hannah Arendt has termed “the
right to have rights.”3 Having fled from the state against which they
hold rights claims, refugees exist in a state of exception, standing
outside of the law and relying on the prospect that a state’s
humanitarian inclinations will outweigh security and economic
interests.
* Assistant Clinical Professor of Law and Director, Terry West Civil Legal
Clinic, University of Tulsa College of Law.
1
G.A. Res 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec.
10, 1948).
2
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, Apr. 22, 1954, 189
U.N.T.S. 137.
3
HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 294 (1951).
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For individuals in this situation, the Refugee Convention
provides no right to asylum that they can assert. In fact, unlike other
human rights treaties, it does not adopt the language of individual
rights at all. Article 2, the only Convention article in which the
refugee is the subject, focuses on the obligation of the refugee to
their host country. Rendering states as subjects, the remaining
provisions employ the language of state obligations. This language
provides no scope for the individual refugee to make claims against
the state.
The language around asylum and refugee protection is rarely
one of fundamental human rights. Instead, refugees are discussed
almost exclusively through the lens of the Refugee Convention and
its concomitant state obligations. The human dignity of the
individual refugee is subsumed by the language of international
relations as words like humanitarian crisis, burden sharing,
sovereignty, security, and economics dominate the refugee debate.
The individual stands apart from this debate. A moving image such
as a child washed ashore may briefly shift attention to humanitarian
considerations, but the larger debate remains unchanged. Outside
of the refugee framework, the practice of human rights protection
faces similar challenges rooted in state interests and the realities of
the international system, but the conceptual framework remains one
of individual rights. By contrast, refugee law and its focus on the
state render the refugee instrumental to other interests not just
practically, but also conceptually.
The dislodgment of individual rights by state interests stands
only to be heightened amidst record numbers of forced migrants.
With over 70.8 million displaced people,4 the assertion of individual
rights gives way to questions of sovereignty and territoriality. In
this context, the Refugee Convention becomes an instrument not of
refugee protection but of migration control. The Convention’s focus
on state obligations facilitates this process. States do not deny the
humanitarian imperative of the Convention, but they increasingly
narrow the categories of individuals who are entitled to protection
under this imperative. The state-centric language of the Convention
enables states to engage in interpretive sleights of hand to narrow
4

Figures at a Glance, UNHCR, https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/figures-ata-glance.html (last visited Sept. 8, 2019).
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the Convention’s reach. The result is that the bulk of migrants today
increasingly fall outside of a state’s interpretation of who is a
refugee. To further minimize the humanitarian aspects of migration,
states label those seeking protection as economic migrants or
security risks.
While states facing high migrant numbers have long engaged
in this practice, the current migration crisis has facilitated its
adoption on a global scale. At the height of Zimbabwe’s
humanitarian crisis in 2008 and 2009, for example, almost 300,000
Zimbabweans sought asylum in South Africa,5 making it the top
global recipient of asylum seekers.6 Ignoring the links between
political dynamics and the humanitarian crisis, South Africa labelled
all Zimbabweans as economic migrants.
Similarly, today
individuals fleeing extreme gang-based violence, recruitment, and
sexual slavery in the Northern Triangle countries of Latin America
are treated as economic opportunists, criminals, and security risks,
while gang-based persecution is excluded from the refugee
definition in the US. In Europe, a refugee who leaves Greece or
Turkey in search of a more fully realized life accordant with human
dignity acquires the status of an economic migrant—a status
imposed in response to their pursuit of the fundamental right to
dignity. Even those fleeing Syria’s brutal civil war do not fall within
the scope of the Convention’s refugee definition unless they are
specifically targeted based on one of the protected grounds. Even
then, they must overcome the security risk label, an obstacle that is
virtually insurmountable in the US as a result of the Muslim ban.
The changing nature of rights violations has sparked calls to
reform the refugee definition so that it aligns more closely with the
types of threats currently giving rise to flight. While well-meaning,
this proposal comes with its own sets of problems. First, any
definition that continues to privilege certain types of harms over
others without recognizing the fundamental rights of the individual
will continue to have winners and losers. In carving out a narrow
humanitarian exception, the stage is set for states to continue to
5

Roni Amit & Norma Kriger, Making Migrants ‘Il-Legible’: The
Policies and Practices of Documentation in Post-Apartheid South Africa, 40
KRONOS 269, 272 (2014).
6
UNHCR, DISPLACEMENT: THE NEW 21ST CENTURY CHALLENGE 25
(2013), https://fas.org/irp/agency/dhs/fema/displace.pdf.
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define individuals out of this exception. Moreover, states are
unlikely to adopt an overly-broad definition that expands their
obligation to accept migrants.
But realpolitik is not the only reason that this solution holds
little promise. In the developing world, where most refugees are
located, legal status may have little effect on an individual’s daily
existence.7 Refugees and asylum seekers are largely unable to access
rights guaranteed to them under both international and domestic law.
The state-centered focus of refugee protection encourages states to
meet their obligations by carving out exceptional spaces for refugees
through camps, offshore facilities, and agreements with other
countries to restrict movement. Individuals may enjoy the bare
minimum of refugee protection in these spaces—protection against
refoulement—but they have no access to fundamental human rights.
Instead, they live a liminal existence, unable to realize many
elements of human dignity—work, education, family life, nondiscrimination, political expression—as these exceptional spaces
operate separately from the rest of the territory and its legal
framework.
What does this mean for the future of refugee protection?
The refugee framework reflects historical realities and power
dynamics. Accordingly, refugee protection has always been
political.8 Barring any seismic shifts in the state-based international
system, this will continue to be the reality. But conceptual shifts are
possible. By understanding migration through a human rights lens,
we can move away from dichotomies between good and bad,
deserving and criminal, or political and economic migrants.
Individuals facing human rights violations of any kind have a right
to escape these violations, regardless of the nature of the threat and
whether it fits into the narrowly defined scope of persecution laid
out in the Refugee Convention.
The right to escape human rights violations is embedded
within a broader freedom of movement rooted in human dignity.
Human dignity is the core concept of human rights. In considering
7

Loren B. Landau & Roni Amit, Wither Policy? Southern African
Perspectives on Understanding Law, ‘Refugee’ Policy and Protection, 27 J.
REFUGEE STUD. 534, 535 (2014).
8
See Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, The Politics of Refugee Protection, 27
REFUGEE SURV. Q. 8 (2008).
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rights violations, courts have found certain non-enumerated rights
such as education and work to be integral to human dignity9 and
have outlawed contentious security practices deemed to violate
human dignity.10 Similarly, the right to movement is an essential
component of human dignity, a linkage that Thomas Jefferson
recognized in characterizing expatriation as an inherent right,
essential to the pursuit of happiness.11
Finally, refugee protection is as much local as it is global.
Rather than speaking exclusively in the lofty language of human
rights, we need to appeal to local constituencies and their concerns.
While states reference sovereignty and national security, individuals
are often focused on more provincial concerns around housing,
labor, health care, and education. It is precisely when these interests
are ignored that populist messages about the dangers of migrants
resonate. By focusing on sectors and policies at the local level, we
can foster support for migrant rights in a way that takes these
concerns into account.
The concept of refugee rights as human rights is found
neither in refugee law nor in state practices around refugee
protection. As a result, the refugee has become largely instrumental
to broader state concerns. Displaced as a subject of the law, the
refugee cannot access international or domestic legal protections, as
states increasingly place refugees in extra-legal spaces. By
reconceptualizing refugees and migrants through a human rights
lens, refugees can re-enter these spaces and reassert their rights. At
the same time, moving beyond a purely humanitarian framework
can serve to challenge populist anti-migrant rhetoric.

9

Minister of Home Affairs v. Watchenuka 2004 (4) SA 326 (SCA) at
paras. 32, 36 (S. Afr.) (finding that a blanket ban on employment and study for
asylum seekers violated the right to human dignity).
10
HCJ 5100/94 Public Committee Against Torture v. Israel 53(4) PD
817 (1999) (finding that the security service’s use of moderate physical pressure
against suspected terrorists in ticking time bomb situations violated human
dignity).
11
Letter from Thomas Jefferson, to John Manners (June 12, 1817),
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/03-11-02-0360.
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